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Civil Society in Post-communist Europe:
A Comparative Analysis of Poland and Hungary

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ABSTRACT

Once being applied to only Western World, the concept of civil society saw its rebirth in the countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) after the collapse of communism. By the end of 1989 number of countries in CEE entered upon the path of democratic transition, and Poland with Hungary being no exception. In fact, civil society and its growth were considered to be an important actor for democratization in the region. Based on that assumption, the purpose of this study was to investigate the role and impact of civil society organizations on democratic transformation of Poland and Hungary. On the grounds of a comparative analysis, another aim was to find out whether pluralist or corporatist type of civil society was more efficient for the democratic consolidation of these countries. These way country specific developments were taken into consideration. General assumption was that pluralist type of civil society are prone to have higher number of competing organizations, while aiming at greater interest aggregation, articulation, and representation and less stable relations with political parties and formal state organizations. Corporatist type of civil society are often dominated by large organizations and tend to be more stable, less diverse and accommodating in their relations with the state. In respect that civil society in Poland was highly pluralist, while in Hungary it was corporatist, it is of interest to find out which type civil society have greater influence on democracy building. Using the data from annual reports supplied by the international data collection organizations, the degree and quality of democratic consolidation, in line with the civil society's development status were analyzed. The results of the study revealed that nowadays both countries have reached relatively high level of democratic consolidation and have viable civil societies. Therefore, the principal

conclusion was that both pluralist and corporatist models of civil society can be equally effective in promoting democracy.

Key words: *democratic consolidation; pluralist civil society; corporatist civil society.*

RESÜMEE

Bisher nur für die westliche Welt relevant, hat das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft seine Wiedergeburt in den Ländern Mittelosteuropas (MOE) nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus erlebt. Bis zum Ende des Jahres 1989 hat eine Vielzahl von Ländern in MOEden Pfad des demokratischen Übergangs genommen; Polen zusammen mit Ungarn stellten da keine Ausnahme dar. Die Zivilgesellschaft und ihr Wachstum werden tatsächlich als ein wichtiger Faktor für die Demokratisierung in der Region angesehen. Gestützt auf diese Annahme war der Zweck dieser Studie, die Rolle und den Einfluss von Zivilgesellschaftsorganisationen auf die demokratische Transformation Polens und Ungarns zu untersuchen. Basierend auf einer vergleichenden Analyse war es ein weiteres Ziel herauszufinden, ob ein pluralistischer oder korporatistischer Typ von Zivilgesellschaft für die demokratische Konsolidierung dieser Länder effizienter ist. Somit konnten länderspezifische Entwicklungen besser in Betracht gezogen werden. Eine allgemeine Annahme war, dass der pluralistische Typ der Zivilgesellschaft eher eine höhere Zahl von miteinander konkurrierenden Organisationen zu haben scheint, womit eine stärkere Interessenaggregation, -artikulation und -repräsentation einhergeht und weniger stabile Beziehungen mit den politischen Parteien und formellen staatlichen Organisationen die Folge sind. Der Typ der korporatistischen Zivilgesellschaft wird häufig von großen Organisationen beherrscht und neigt dazu, stabiler, weniger verschieden und in seinen Beziehungen mit dem Staat komplementärer zu sein. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass die Zivilgesellschaft in Polen sehr plural war, während sie in Ungarn korporative Züge zeigte, ist es von Interesse herauszufinden, welcher Typ Zivilgesellschaft einen größeren Einfluss auf die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Demokratie hat. Mit den Daten internationaler Datenerfassungsorganisationen und ihren Jahresberichten

wurden der Grad und die Qualität der demokratischen Konsolidierung in Übereinstimmung mit dem Entwicklungsstatus der Zivilgesellschaft analysiert. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie haben gezeigt, dass heutzutage beide Länder ein relativ hohes Niveau der demokratischen Konsolidierung erreicht haben und lebensfähige Zivilgesellschaften aufweisen. Daher kann abschließend festgehalten werden, dass sowohl pluralistische als auch korporatistische Modelle der Zivilgesellschaft in der Förderung der Demokratie wirksam sein können.

Schlüsselwörter: demokratische Konsolidierung; pluralistische Zivilgesellschaft; korporatistische Zivilgesellschaft

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEE – Central Eastern Europe

CSOs – Civil Society Organizations

NGOs – Non-governmental organizations

EU – European Union

USSR –The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

BTI – Bertelsmann Transformation Index

EVS – European Values Survey

ESS – European Social Survey

PO – Platforma Obywatelska or Civic Platform Party in Poland

PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość or Law and Justice Party in Poland

SZDSZ – Association of Free Democrats in Hungary

HDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum

ISP – Institute for Public Affairs in Warsaw, Poland

CBOs – Community Based Organizations

NIOK – Nonprofit Information and Training Center

OPZZ – All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions

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1. INTRODUCTION

With approach of 1980s civil society in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) settled down to a course of revival and recovery from long years of stagnation. The year of 1989 became significant in the light of revolutionary events, which swept across the countries of CEE and in the subsequent fall of communism. Poland became one of the first countries, where labor movement named Solidarity organized revolutionary protest, which later resulted in a peaceful power transfer. The domino effect snapped into action, thus making Hungary to take up the lead of Poland. Hungarian civil society organizations adopted Polish experience by also revolting against the communist government. With collapse of the communism, newly-minted and reform-minded liberal leaders embarked upon taking all necessary measures towards democratic transition. Particularly civil society organizations (CSOs) have played an important role in the social and economic transition of CEE. In fact, these organizations experienced rapid growth in size and span, covering the most diverse fields of activity, including human rights, education, media, environment, health care, social protection and so forth. Sure enough, the fact that civil society is fully engaged in handling societal problems is indisputable. Then question arises as to whether civil society can exert and influence on the democratization process. Admittedly, it is a common practice that CSOs perform important social, political and community functions during the process of democratization. For instance, CSOs are considered to be important means for the development of the political, economic and social reform. In CEE newly emerging CSOs embraced democracy, thus disseminating democratic values among the citizens and creating viable civic practices, which had a profound effect on societal attitudes, behavior and organization.

This study examines in a comparative perspective the development of civil society sector in Poland and Hungary during the transition to democratic system and its impact on the democratization process. The main assumption is that the growth of the sector is strongly related to the existing conditions in the individual countries at the beginning of the transformation. Moreover, civil society's sectoral composition is also shaped by the strength of grass-roots activities, the networks of alliances, political affiliations and dependencies (Ekiert and Foa 2011). Consequently, taking into account the fact that civil society in Poland is prone to more pluralist type of interest representation, whereas Hungary represents corporatist type of civil society, the following hypotheses are applicable:

Pluralist civil societies, such as Polish one, tend to have more organizational growth and destruction, fragmented sectors with higher number of organizations, more competition among organizations, and less stable relations with political parties, local and national state administration, thus leading to a higher number of contentious activity.

Corporatist civil societies, such as Hungarian one, dominated by large organizations tend to be more stable, less diverse and accommodating in their relations with the state.

Thus, it is clear that CSOs in Poland and Hungary are diverse to a significant degree in terms of their organization and activities. However, addressing the issue of democratic transition in the given countries, again, the question arises as to what type of civil society (pluralist or corporatist) is most favorable and effective for democratic consolidation. Considering the current development and capacity of CSOs and recent assessment of democratic consolidation in above mentioned countries, it is possible to assume that:

Despite different development paths taken by Poland and Hungary and different degrees to which they affected on democratic transition process, nowadays both countries have reached relatively high level of democratic consolidation, which serves as confirmation of that both pluralist and corporatist models of civil society can be equally effective in promoting democracy.

These assumptions have determined the logic and the format of the study. The thesis is structured into several chapters. The first chapter seeks to provide a conceptual framework on the broad notion of civil society through a historical and systemic analysis of extant theoretical reflection. Due to the numerous definitions of civil society and its enormous scope, both throughout history and today, the first chapter gives an explanation of specific meanings and an introduction to some of the general components and main debates that have developed over recent years. This chapter also includes a conceptual map designed to provide some orientation on the subject. Chapter two concentrates on the existing theories and concepts of modern democracy, in order to identify the relevant criteria for what might be called ‘sufficient consolidation’. In addition, this chapter gives an account on major functions that need to be fulfilled by CSOs in their aim of strengthening democracy. Chapter three offers empirical background on the development of the civil society sector in Hungary and Poland during the transition. The size of the sector, effects of public protest, as well as the civic participation rate will be examined in comparative perspective. Chapter four presents necessary rough empirical account of the state of civil society in the given countries and the degree to which democracy has been consolidated. Chapter six summarizes the conclusions of the study and outlines potential implications for theory on civil society.

1.1 METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The thesis paper seeks to analyze as stated civil society in the two post-communist countries of CEE, namely Poland and Hungary based on the comparative approach. Comparison will be carried out by the following indicators: type of civil society, organizational growth of civil society, number of public protests, civic

participation, degree and quality of democratic consolidation and current state of civil society in the two countries. The analysis of these indicators revealed certain similarities and differences, which are further explained and used to depict the relationship of civil society with the state and its role in the process of democratization.

The countries were selected according to their similar geographic location, historical background and similar initial situation before the democratic transition started. Both Poland and Hungary had a communist past and are located in the same region of CEE. Moreover, in 1989 after the collapse of communist governments these countries had to introduce policies and institutions to achieve a democratic system and it is worthy of note that they have taken different paths on the way towards democratic transformation. It was extremely interesting to monitor the transition process in the countries where either pluralism or corporatism prevailed. The time frame for the comparison was limited to the beginning of transition period in 1989 and current time, namely the year of 2012.

Along with the comparative method of study, the method of secondary data analysis was applied. During the research, thorough review of accessible and reliable existing data on civil society was made. The majority of the data used in the analysis were obtained from annual reports supplied by international data collection organizations such as Freedom House, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), European Values Survey (EVS) and European Social Survey (ESS). More specifically, descriptive qualitative analysis of tables and charts taken from these surveys was made.

Data sources:

Data for the popular protest index during the early years of transition period was obtained from independent research conducted by Ekiert and Kubik. They employ an event count methodology, drawing on a large number of newspaper accounts of protests and other forms of collective action in the period 1989-1993 (Kopstein 2003).

Data for the democracy and civil society indexes were obtained from both BTI of 2006 and Freedom House ‘Nations in Transit’ report of 2012. BTI data are collected every two years in 119 countries of the world and reviewed in four steps: first by the local experts, second by German experts on that country, then by regional coordinators, and lastly by specialists on interregional calibration. BTI gives insight into the status of democracy in the given country as well as to its development and transformation status. Similar to that, Freedom House report measures progress and setbacks in democratization in 29 countries of the world. Also, it determinates the growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process (see Freedom House). The country reports are written by Freedom House country specialists and staff members.

Data for the membership and public participation index were obtained from the third wave EVS of 1999/2000, which contains the survey results for 33 countries. The data is collected during the field work in each country by conducting face to face interviews of the adult citizens aged 18 years and over.

Data for the public trust index were obtained from the first round ESS of 2002. It is a large-scale comparative research project conducted in over 30 countries of the

world and funded jointly by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating country (see ESS methodology). The survey looks into the meaning of citizenship for citizens themselves and their trust towards formal organizations.

Last but not least, the thesis is subject to certain limitations. First and foremost, the research of civil society in Poland and Hungary has been based entirely on secondary literature. Although secondary data available on the topic is very comprehensive, own field-work research would have given another, deeper dimension to the thesis. Other limitation is associated with impossibility of use of sources in both Polish and Hungarian languages due to the lack of knowledge. Being able to use sources in original languages would have been an advantage and would definitely give bigger depth and comprehension to the research.

2. CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPT AND EMERGENCE IN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION

2.1 HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The term ‘civil society’ had a long history of rise and fall. The notion of civil society came into being in the ancient times and can be traced in the works of ancient Greek philosophers. According to the Greek natural law, society was regulated by the universal moral standards. Indeed, all members of society adhered to certain ethical standards on their own free will, rather than on the burden of the state authorities. Therefore, civil society was equated to the state, which actions were oriented towards the public good. Subsequently, in the European Middle Ages the natural law of Ancient Greeks was altered into the law of God. For this reason, it was very convenient for the state to effectively govern the society. Certain hierarchy existed among the members of society and they accepted ascribed statuses, as it was thought to be given by God and part of the natural order. However, with the emergence of capitalism and development of science and technology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, previous conceptions of civil society became outdated and were no longer feasible in explanation of the individuals’ relations to the larger society. The Scottish Enlightenment of the late eighteenth century has paved the way for the emergence of the modern idea of civil society. Civil society was now defined in contrast to the state. It was a society characterized by the rule of law, based on fundamental individual rights, which was enforced by a political authority that is also subject to the rule of law (Kaldor 2003, 17). Locke, one of the most influential enlightenment philosophers and the founder of classical liberalism, was the first person to determine the civil society to be an independent body, separate from the state. He argued that people constitute a unique community in which the state cannot intervene. Moreover, civil society’s main agenda was protection of individual’s civil

rights and material goods in opposition to the state and its arbitrary interference (qtd. in Paffenfolz and Spurk 2006). Montesquieu, on the other hand, alleged a certain sense of balance between the state power and the civil society associations. In his view, political and civil society should be distinguished, due to the fact that political society acts as an intermediary between state and people, while civil society acts as a regulator of relations between people. However, he emphasized the importance of state authority respecting the principles of rule of law and being restricted by counterweigh authority of the autonomous civil society associations (qtd. in Paffenfolz and Spurk 2006). Moreover, civil society was understood as a realm, where people allied according to their personal interests and preferences. It was Hegel, who defined civil society as equal to bourgeois society and a society that included market. For Hegel, civil society was an achievement of modern world ... and an outcome of the historical process of the market economy development, which enabled the reconciliation of private wants. The state was conceived by him as a mediator and guarantor of civil society (Kaldor 2003). Further ascending demand for liberty has affected on the level of civil unification in their aspiration for freedom, which consequently resulted in revolutions.

After World War II civil society gained popularity and became distinct from both the state and the market. Italian Marxist theorist Gramsci asserted that the main function of CSOs is opposition to the state rule. In his view, civil society should be distinguished from the state and market and should contain a big variety of organizations that appear to be a challenge to the existing political system. He was concerned about dictatorship and viewed civil society as a sphere of independent political activity, which is crucial for struggle against state oppression. Gramsci's ideas had a profound effect on the opposition to totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe

and Latin America and gave an opportunity for people to unite in pursuance of their common objective (Lewis 2002). The French political thinker and also representative of the classical liberalism, Tocqueville defined civil society as a network of voluntary associations, which promote democratic principles among its members and strive to serve as a protector of individual rights against the lead of the authoritarian state. These associations unite weak but equal people together, so that they together can form powerful networks. In fact, Tocqueville claims that membership in the civil society organizations enhance the feelings of trust and confidence among people, and teaches them to value and successfully exercise their liberties (Putnam 2000). The nineteenth century was remarkable with rapid outspread of radical individualism. The primary driving force of the world was the clash of the market against the state. The private has been explicitly contrasted with the public. The market has proven to be self-sufficing and did not require state regulation; the state on the other hand, was growing steadily. During this time, people were engaged in the cooperative and associational activities that were neither funded by the state nor market oriented. In the twentieth and twenty first centuries the term has enjoyed a remarkable renaissance. With the spread of democracy across the world, civil society became vital tool in promotion of the democratic values in the formerly authoritarian countries. Nevertheless, in Western European countries where democracy was already well practiced, civil society was interpreted as means of social renewal. A German sociologist and philosopher, Habermas stressed that civil society played a key role in delivering people's wants within the public sphere. Since the public sphere had an adequate influence on the political action, civil society was a preeminent agent that was able to combine the interests and concerns of the public and make an impact on the political course of action. Political parties alone were not able to execute these

functions, and thus needed alternative ways of hearing societal problems and concerns. Thus, civil society was used primarily as means to improve governance and democratization. The age of vast information technology development provided new tools for forging connections, thus more empowering the citizens.

2.2 CIVIL SOCIETY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTIONS

As shown previously, over the years the concept of civil society has been approached from different perspectives. Scholars coming from various disciplines offer manifold definitions of the realm. However, most scholars seem to agree that “civil society is the arena of voluntary, uncoerced collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values” (qtd. in Paffenfolz and Spurk 2006). In fact, international organization such as the Department of International Development (DFID) adopted the following definition of civil society, which fits best for the purpose of the paper:

Civil society is located between the state, the private sector and the family or household, where society debates and negotiates matters of common concern and organizes to regulate public affairs. It embraces:

Institutionalized groups: such as religious organizations, trades unions, business associations and co-operatives.

Local organizations: such as community associations, farmers' associations, local sports groups, non-governmental organizations and credit societies.

Social movements and networks (qtd. in Seckinelgin 2006).

In general, the most principal definitions of civil society can be classified into three types: descriptive, analytical and normative. Descriptive approach refers to civil society as a specific social space or sphere. As Kubik points out, it is a space between family and the state (1999, 83). Gellner argues that “it excludes both stifling communalism and centralized authoritarianism” (qtd. in Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 83). Kubik adopts the perspective proposed by Habermas and claims that this public space

is where the public organizers themselves are bearers of public opinion. Therefore, being institutionally protected from the state's subjective infringement, citizens are free to form their own organizations. Moreover, civil society is viewed as a mediatory sphere between the state and economic sectors. Janoski claims that "civil society represents a sphere of dynamic and responsive public discourse between the state, the public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations, and the market sphere concerning private firms and unions" (1998, 12). Merkel and Lauth, in contrast, suggest that civil society is not a sector on its own but the space between societal sectors (qtd. in Dudouet 2007). An example would be, when actors accredited to other sectors can also perform in civil society that is when entrepreneurs, who represent the business sector, operate in the civil society to demand their business concerns in the form of lower tax exemptions.

In analytical sense, civil society can be defined as a set or system of specific social groups, whose members act together in order to accomplish common goals. Schmitter suggests a very precise description of this definition:

'Civil society' is defined as a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups:

1. that are relatively independent of both public authorities and private units of production and reproduction, i.e., of firms and families;
2. that are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in defense/promotion of their interests/passions;
3. but do *not* seek to replace either state agents or private (re) producers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole;
4. but *do* agree to act within pre-established rules of "civil" or legal nature (qtd. in Ekiert and Kubik 1999).

Moreover, an analytical concept has various aspects to look at. The most principal ones include the third sector and the social capital aspects. Firstly, civil society is very often described in the framework of the third sector. The third sector is also recognized as being separate from the state, market or family. In the 1990s the third

sector captured substantial attention of the public, as it functioned independently from the state and market, therefore was not government controlled by any means. Admittedly, third sector consisted of organizations that are not profit oriented. Even if they gain certain profit, it is not being distributed among the members or stakeholders, who engage in these organizations on voluntary basis. Therefore, the third sector is often referred as non-profit sector. Despite the variety of the institutions that are part of the third sector, they all share some common features:

- They are set up as organizations, i.e., they have an institutional presence;
- They do not distribute profits or dividends to managers or owners;
- They are self-governing;
- They are voluntary in the sense that membership is not legally required, and attract some level of voluntary contribution of time or money, and
- They provide services to their members or to clients (Solomon and Anheier 1999).

While third sector organizations tend to obtain certain economic force and can deliver services and provide employment positions as state and other businesses do, the debate on the third sector focuses on the circumstances under which it can prosper (Solomon and Anheier 1999). Moreover, the third sector was seen as an agent of change in developing countries. On the other hand, civil society debate has different focus and objectives, despite the fact that it includes the same organizations as the third sector does. It focalizes on the political, social or cultural implications and effects of CSOs on democratization (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006).

Secondly, the term ‘social capital’ was coined by Bourdieu and later adopted by Putnam. In Putnam’s view, social capital is the main prerequisite for the establishment and maintenance of civil society. According to him, social networks correspond to the significant capital, which can be enjoyed for its own sake and used for material gain of individuals and social groups (Putnam 2000). Moreover, Putnam acknowledges the positive impact of the social capital on the spread of democratic values and behaviors among the people. According to him, long term historical

practice of joining organizations directed at public purposes as vital in the development of civic consciousness and trust, which later assisted the process of the establishment of democratic forms of governance. Thus, the existence of strong and feasible civil society was a prerequisite for democracy. However, this approach has been criticised for being too idealistic.

Finally, civil society can be looked at from the normative perspective. Ekiert and Kubik suggest that civil society is a ‘normative project’, a discourse, a collective dream, that mobilizes people to action against the oppressive state (1999). So, in this case civil society is viewed as a counter power to the state. It represents and defends the interests of the public through non-violent action. Social movements are often the most frequent civil society actors who adopt this role.

In this paper both descriptive and analytical definitions will be adopted, understanding civil society as a space and as a set of social groups inhabiting this space. The space must be institutionally established, stabilized, and guaranteed by legal regulations (Ekiert and Kubik 1999). Usually it is the main task of CSOs to create and protect this space. Taking into account the fact that civil society can be diverse in its internal composition and can consist of different sectors, Ekiert and Kubik suggest that depending on the system or regime under which it exists, its size and inner diversification may either increase or diminish. Its size is also an indicator of degree of democratization and participation. For instance, it could be stipulated by the independence that civil society organizations are granted under this regime, the particularity of the society, and the prevailing political practices of the elites. Thus, the significance of these sectors, their diverse degrees of institutionalization, and their mutual relationships depend on the type of polity within which they operate (1999).

Descriptive and analytical concepts of civil society can be applied to the cases of Poland and Hungary. Even though during the early years of democratic transition, both countries were not able to ensure adherence to the principles of rule of law, later there has been made a great progress. First of all, civil society in such systems is considered to be an autonomous public space, that is protected by law. According to Gellner, the survivability of civil society organizations depend upon the inclusiveness of their autonomy and on the extent they are separated from the traditional, illiberal communities (qtd. in Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 83). The more these organizations demonstrate their distinction from the traditional communities, the more likely they will continue to possess an autonomy. In the authoritarian systems, in contrast, civil society's vigour depends on its explication with customary communities. Secondly, in the systems based on rule of law, all social networks are formally equal, in other words, they are expected to have the same level of institutional durability as long as they act within the applicable legal framework. Since, civil society groups are institutionally protected by law, they enjoy the freedom of having diverse structure, functions and political influence. Therefore, civil society differs from country to country in terms of its conformation, respective strength, and institutionalization pattern. Moreover, they vary according to their organizational structure. Since, most of them compete for resources, members, and political access, it is very important to distinguish their size and scope. Indeed, sectoral arrangement of civil societies may vary. Ekiert and Kubik suggest that contemporary civil societies are composed of seven sectors, which include 1) labor organizations, 2) traditional interest groups, 3) social movements, 4) youth organizations, 5) NGOs; 6) religious/ethnic associations, and 7) neighborhood and recreational associations (1999, 82).

Furthermore, two forms of public participation can be distinguished. First is cooperative forms of public participation, which implies either membership or participation in neighborhood or local associations. For instance, it could be local projects, churches, or recreational associations. Second is antagonistic collective action, which may be manifested in the forms of resistance and protest. Such contentious collective action occurs when the civil society actors interact with the state and try to defend and promote their interests through various forms of resistance and protest. While under the oppressive regimes resistance among the civil society actors is more common, in the open political systems protest is frequently practiced (Scott 1990).

To sum up, this chapter has described recent definitions and concepts of civil society, which include descriptive, analytical and normative approaches. Moreover, it revealed that civil society associations differ from country to country by their organisational structure, the functions they execute and by specific modes of public participation. The following chapter will focus on giving a brief description of the two main types of civil society organizations.

2.3 PLURALIST VS. CORPORATIST TYPES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Currently two major ideal types of civil society can be distinguished, first refers to the pluralist and second to the corporatist type of democracy. While “pluralist interest groups are made up of multiple associations focusing on a single interest issue, and the groups are voluntary, decentralized, and separated from the government, corporatist politics is generally more organized and is characterized by a single association for each societal interest, typically with compulsory and universal membership and with central organization” (*Pluralism (Social Science)*). The point to

be emphasized is that pluralist civil society represents the diversity of interests by different organizations before everything else, therefore they often comprise generous amount of social categories, which may differ according to their ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural characteristics. Moreover, pluralist civil society claims to be entirely autonomous from the state, due to the exclusive right of each community to be in a position to obtain their own liberties, including freedom of association and authority. Therefore, “pluralists would try to design public institutions in such a way as to enhance the ability of individual citizens to freely associate in the pursuit of their interests, whatever the substance of those interests” (Magagna 1988, 434). Particularly, within this pluralist view of society, the functions of the state are perceived in limited terms. The state is expected to promote public order and welfare by facilitating the free development of independent social, cultural, religious, and economic organizations rather than by infringing upon or assuming them (Maritain 1951, 10-19). If it fails to do so, pluralist civil societies often respond by organizing protest actions or other pushback activities.

Corporatists, in contrast to pluralist civil society rather put their efforts on achieving economic integration and growth in the country than putting protest and interest articulation first. Therefore, in comparison to pluralist civil society they are much bigger in size and fewer in quantity. These corporatist civil societies are called strategic actors, because they obtain sufficient power to directly affect economic outcomes in specific arenas of a national economy. As a result, corporatist groups closely collaborate with state authorities and with each other in order to reach a consensus that embodies the greatest benefits at the least cost. Therefore, strategic actors play decisive role in policymaking in those sectors of activity that are relevant to their interests. Consequently, they are less likely to be involved in

destabilizing activity, which could in any way threaten economic growth and stability of the country. Furthermore, a distinguishing feature of the corporatist civil society institutions is that they hold a monopoly status in their policy field, which ensures lack of competition in the interest representation process as opposed to the pluralist civil societies, which are highly competitive. As in Cawson's words, the monopoly status also enables corporatist groups for self-regulation through the "disciplined co-operation of members" (qtd. in Molina and Rhodes 2002).

As noted above pluralist and corporatist types of civil society have their unique features. Major difference between them lies in the different ways of interest representation. While pluralist civil society attempt at representing maximum number of public interests in a plural way, corporatist civil society give their preference to represent unified societal interests. And it remains to be seen which of these types of civil society can have the best impact on the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, the following chapters of research will be devoted to clarifying this issue.

2.4 CIVIL SOCIETY IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE: A SHORT OVERVIEW

To give the reader an overview of the civil society development in the Western and Eastern Parts of Europe their major peculiarities will be further described. It is worthy of note that Western model is often viewed as an ideal type of civil society, which is subject of imitation for others, and countries of CEE being of no exception.

In the words of Paffenfolz and Spurk, civil society in Western Europe has gone though three different phases of development. If in the first phase its actions were directed at protecting civil and human rights of the individuals and demanding the political participation of the civil society actors, in the second phase, instead, the main focus was shifted to the specific interests of the social associations, oftenly an

emphasis was put on the conflicts arising in the society and hardships faced by its members. Moreover, it is worthy of note that during the second phase civil society has attracted diverse range of actors, including people who were bound by the uniform occupation, religion or personal interests (2006). The third phase was remarkable by the appearance of new social movements which were taking place in the 1960s. According to Lauth, the most prominent ones included feminist, student, peace and environmental movements (qtd. in Paffenfolz and Spurk 2006).

Eastern European countries attracted attention of many researchers, who claimed that there were three types of transitions most of these countries were going through, first they were political transformations from dictatorship to democracy, which often combined with state transformation due to the disintegration of the USSR, and economic transformation from state to market economy. Many scholars emphasized the importance of the civil society in the transformation and democratization processes of CEE. Existence of the strong civil society was seen as an important precondition for the intellectual and democratic development of the society. As Zimmer points out, “the successful future of CEE’s communities is based on a dynamic civil society from which emanates a decisive impulse for empowerment, democracy, cultural exchange, and mutual understanding” (2004, 11). Moreover, it is important for the CSOs themselves to fulfill certain requirements, such as high level of democratic procedures incorporated in their organizational structure, an ability of fostering communications between its members and the civility of their actions, which basically imply actions directed at public good.

When drawing parallels between the development of Western and Eastern European civil societies, it can be clearly seen that they are partly very different from each other. Several authors claim that civil society in Eastern Europe is weaker in

terms of lower level of participation in voluntary organizations, less employment opportunities provided by the organizations and state funding, which implies no autonomy from state intervention (Mansfeldowa and Nalesz 2004). Further, Howard indicates three main reasons of the Eastern European civil society's weakness in comparison to its Western fellows. He claims that voluntary organizations in these countries are not considered as being advantageous, due to the fact that under the socialist system it was common for people to freely express their opinion in front of their family and friends, rather than on public. The circumstance of no small importance was that such close networks often resulted in the economic benefits, such as getting rare goods from family members or friends. Widespread distrust towards formal organizations was another important reason of low level of civic participation in the voluntary organizations. Under the socialist regime formal organizations were controlled by state and membership in them was often compulsory, which gave occasion to the spread of distrust amongsts people in such organizations. The third reason listed by Howard lied in Eastern Europeans dissapointment in the welfare performance of their states after the shift from socialist to the liberal-democratic systems (2003). Despite abovesaid weaknesses of civil society in CEE, examples of Poland and Hungary offered hope for a better future, given the rapid democratization process in the region. The following chapters will concentrate on assessing the progress of democratic consolidation in the two countries.

3. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION

3.1 INTERLINKAGE BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

One might already wondered about the relationship between civil society and democracy. Is there any linkage between these two terms? “In democratic theory, most studies on the linkages between civil society and democratic transition deal predominantly with the impact of civil society mobilisation on democratisation processes, or CSOs roles at the various stages of system change” (Dudouet 2007). It is important to note that civil society’s influence on the democratization process is highly dependent on the regime type and, therefore, may vary from case to case. Democratic theory suggests that there are three phases of political change from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. First stage is called pre-transition authoritarianism, which refers to the liberalization of the autocratic regime; second stage can be marked as democratic transition, which is characterized by liberalization of the political system and institutionalization of democracy; the third stage resides in the post-transition democracy consolidation. In each phase CSOs execute different functions that are fundamental for promotion of democracy and, therefore, they often have structural peculiarities and conceptions which pertain to the particular socio-political setting.

During the first stage, namely liberalization of autocratic regime, it is of utmost importance for the civil society to act as a counterpart to the old system. Thus, the efficiency of the CSOs during this period is much more important than its democratic structure. Moreover, it is essential for CSOs to put aside their differences and strive for the common goal of liberalization and democratization. It is of

undoubtful advantage if one or two CSOs dominate over others, since it can help to bring about efficiency and international solidarity. As Merkel and Lauth stress, at this stage, it is vital for the civil society not to cooperate in any terms with the previous regime, but make demands on the formally guaranteed freedoms (qtd. in Dudouet 2007). In witness whereof, one can refer to the example of Solidarity movement in Poland, which was a strategic and dominating actor united a huge number of workers in fight for replacement of the communistic regime.

The second stage characterized as institutionalization of democracy is critical in the transition process. It requires establishment of new institutional order and new constitution which result in inevitable dissolving of the old rule. In fact, it is necessary for CSOs to communicate and cooperate with reform forces, including those from the old ruling elites. CSOs can either bring their actions together, which beyond controversy gives them a head start, or they can act independently in pursuance of their particular interests as commonly practiced in the liberal democracies. An excellent example of cooperation between civil society and the state was Hungary, where the transition to democracy was negotiated and agreed upon by the communist elite and democratic opposition. Arato suggests that institutionalization of civil society in the sense of politically relevant and relatively stable associations and publics is achieved by the following institutions and practices:

- a. guarantee of fundamental rights of association, assembly, speech, press, and coalision, which in turn presuppose ;
- b. establishment of a legally operative constitution supported by the separation of powers especially independent courts ;
- c. institutionalization of a politically accessible and also relatively decentralized media of communication, relatively independent from both government and market ;
- d. political and economic decentralization, involving i. independent local and regional self-government and ii. possibility and facilitation of local ans small scale forms of enterprise ;
- e. acceptance and recognition of the operation of national ans international organizations (NGO's) and institutions dedicated to the monitoring and defenses of rights (ombudsman, transnational courts) ;

- f. the existence of channels of political consultation, and the creation and financing of specific political roles for civil society associations ;
- g. the constitutionalization of democratic role for associations of civil society (1996).

Further Arato argues that fulfilment of the first two criterias (a,b) brings about some level of institutionalization, while fulfilment of most of the criterias can result in the high level of institutionalization. Moreover, many other factors can influence on the institutionalization level during the transition process: politics of civil society before the transition, demands of the society, power relations between the three main forces (state, market and civil society), and the ideologies common to the participants.

The third and the last stage is equally important. “During the consolidation of democracy, civil society can act in a Tocquevillian sense as ‘schools of democracy’ for the formation and establishment of democratic virtues and accumulation of the social capital” (Eisele 2005). What makes consolidation of democracy different from institutionalization is that it allows for the subsequent entrenchment, backing and rooting of the newly established democratic system conducive to democratic stability (Puhle 2005). Indeed, Puhle claims that “democratic consolidation is a complex process with institutional, attitudinal and behavioral dimensions in which usually many more factors and actors intervene and more arenas matter than in the process of the transition” (2005). Consolidation is not always the continuation of the democratic transition process; it is a different process which usually has more influence on the quality of the new democracy than the agglomerations of the transition (Morlino 2004). Puhle indicates that democratic regime can be considered as sufficiently, but never completely, consolidated if and when the rules of the democratic game are respected and considered legitimate by all significant political groups (2005), that is, for instance, if and when democracy is ‘the only game in town’ (Przeworski 1991).

Diamond characterizes democratic consolidation as:

a process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioral and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrows its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of the democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and other functions that civil society performs. But most of all it requires political institutionalization (1994).

Bunbongkarn, in contrast, considers democracy as consolidated when a reversal to authoritarianism is impossible. For him it is a complex process and the factors contributing to democratic consolidation include structural and cultural dimensions (2001). Others consider democracy as consolidated when it becomes stable, relatively vibrant, efficient and accountable by the state.

After defining what democratic consolidation means, it is important to indicate the impact of the civil society on this process. In many cases, newly emerging democratic systems happen to be weak, vulnerable and inefficient; therefore they require consolidation and strengthening. Referring to the democratization theory, Ekiert and Kubik acknowledge that “the revival, resurrection, or reinventing of civil society is an important part of transition to democracy and an essential precondition for democratic consolidation” (1999). Further, they describe the aspect of democratization in the post-communist countries as the “process combining the resurrection with the reconfiguration of civil society” (Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 100), since many organizations inherited from the old regime became dominant players in the new public scene. Taking into account the fact that reconfiguration and reinstitutionalization of civil society may differ from country to country, it is possible to assume that the role and character of civil organizations may also vary.

Furthermore, some basic conditions vital for the democratic consolidation should be indicated. One of the essential conditions lies in strong belief and commitment of the elites to democracy. Representatives of the elite (politicians,

organizational leaders, government officials and other important decision makers) should have a strong faith in the democratic principles and must act in accordance with the democratic norms. If they do so, reversal to an authoritarian rule will be difficult, if not impossible. Commitment to democracy implies no restriction on political participation or freedom imposed by the elites for the purpose of maintaining political preeminence. The second condition requires strong commitment to the democratic principles by the society itself. In this case, for the democracy to be consolidated, it is important that majority of the people consider democracy as the best form of government that is appropriate for that particular time. Since in most of the emerging democracies this idea is not deep-rooted in the public mind, some social clusters are often encouraged and manipulated into using violence or other non democratic methods in struggling for their cause. Accordingly, the commitment to democratic norms by organizations and groups can be claimed as the third condition for consolidating democracy. “Political parties, social movements, CSOs, interest groups, and other social organizations can play an important role in strengthening and deepening democracy. They can serve as a mechanism for political participation and mobilization, disseminating democratic principles and norms” (Bunbongkarn 2001). In order to provide deeper understanding of the civil society’s role in the process of democratic consolidation the next chapter will focus on the major democratic functions executed by the CSOs.

3.2 DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY

CSOs can assist democratic consolidation in the number of ways. According to Huntington, one of the basic democratic functions of civil society is to provide “the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society,

and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control” (qtd. in Diamond 1994). This idea takes its roots in the eighteenth century when civil society was viewed as an opposition to the state. Diamond notes that “civil society is a vital instrument for containing the power of democratic governments, checking their potential abuses and violations of the law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny” (1994). When CSOs effectively check, monitor, restrain, in certain way, the exercise of power by the state and hold it accountable, this activities may result in the substantial reduction of corruption among the political elites, which often is pervasive in the newly emerging democracies. Being under the arbitrary rule for the long period of time, the new democracies lack the legal and bureaucratic means to fight against corruption, therefore, without a free and inquisitive press and civic groups to press for institutional reform, corruption is likely to flourish in those systems (Diamond 1994). In addition, civil society’s monitoring function “can force the government to be more accountable, transparent, and responsive to the public, which strengthens its legitimacy” (Bunbongkarn 2001). As previously described, this function is mostly exercised by the pluralist civil societies, such as Poland. While corporatist civil societies tend to have more give-and-take relationships with the state.

Second function of CSOs lies in consolidating democracy by motivating political participation. By virtue of the fact that in some arising democracies citizens’ voluntary political participation is relatively low, which originates from the long history of political indifference and apathy rooted in the public minds, the consolidation process may often be decelerated. Besides, Diamond points out that “rich associational life supplements the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and

promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship” (1994). CSOs encourage people to get involved in politics, which consequently strengthens the legitimacy and the institutionalization of democratic government, thus paving the way for consolidation process.

Another important function of the civil society consist in the dissemination of the democratic principles and values such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and respect for the opposing viewpoints among the elites and the mass public. Usually CSOs that are concerned specifically with protection of civil rights and freedoms, as well as political reform, can be of utmost importance in this regard. In fact, the foremost effective way of spreading the democratic values and norms among people, is by providing them with an opportunity to participate in CSOs, thus letting them to gain important skills in political advocacy and contestation.

The fourth function recognizes civil society’s role in empowering the people, through representing their interests and asserting the rights and power of the citizens. CSOs are capable of “creating channels other than political parties for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests of people” (Diamond 1994). One of the major advantages of this function is that it enables traditionally excluded groups (women or ethnic minority groups) to gain access to power, which was denied to them in the previous times, and help them to fight more effectively for their interests, thereby giving them more empowerment. In Eastern Europe, even after the transition to democratic system, some signs of deterioration in the political and social status of women could be seen. In Waylen’s words, “only with sustained, organized pressure from civil society, can political and social equality be advanced, and the quality, responsiveness, and legitimacy of democracy thus be deepened” (1994). In this regard

pluralist civil societies such as Poland are capable of representing the wider range of interests, due to their diversity.

Fifth, as in the Polish case development of the pluralistic civil society generates wide array of interests that previously might have been at variance with each other, but when joined under the common organization these interests might be adjusted, thus mitigating the major polarities of political conflict. In other words, individuals have manifold interests and they join different organization in pursuance of those interests, therefore they will most probably associate with other people who have different political interests and opinions.

Sixth function of CSOs lies in training and recruiting of future political leaders. Having qualified and well trained leaders and activists may lead to the successful functioning of CSOs in the long run. Future leaders gain important skills which can help in organizing and motivating people, administering programs and staff, reconciling conflicts and building coalitions. “This teaches them to deal efficiently with political challenges and can mold competent political leaders” (Bunbongkarn 2001). An excellent example could be trade union activist and co-founder of the Solidarity movement in Poland, Lech Wałęsa, who later became the president.

3.3 PLURALIST VS. CORPORATIST FORMS OF DEMOCRACY

One of the most auspicious forms of liberal democracy appears to be pluralism, which is based on the assumption that a diversity of views and identities, or a plurality of power centers is essential to ensure democratic outcomes. Above all, pluralist theories of democracy give priority to the representative role of civil society groups and organizations in setting the agenda of democratic politics,

thereby ensuring outcomes that reflect a sufficiently wide spectrum of public opinion (Ekiert and Foa, 2011). In fact, pluralism scatters power and contributes to the vitality of the democratic community by acting as an auditor of a strong state, thus fulfilling its major function of checking and scrutinizing state policies. Additionally, it can support identification with the democratic state by recognizing and valuing the diverse communities to which citizens belong. One of the most recognizable adherents of the pluralist democratic theory is Dahl, who asserts that pluralism of identity (race, ethnicity, religion) is generally a feature of less competitive political systems, while pluralism of interests is a feature of a democracy (1982). Indeed, he claimed that the more society is composed of the citizens with multidimensional identity cleavages rather than reinforcing cleavages, the stronger it is in democratic terms. The complexity of the identity cleavages in the society reflects common interest on some issues and opposing interest on others. This implies that a democratic society is one in which a large variety of issue-oriented movements draw together new constituencies that cut across identity lines (Dahl 1982). Primarily, pluralistic view suggests the density of civic organizations, and in particular membership of organizations such as labor unions, business groups, or groups that represent salient social issues, competition among organizations and normative pluralism as an indicators of the health of civic life (Ekiert and Foa 2011).

The opposite of pluralism is corporatism, which is oriented at improving the economic capabilities of democratic states by shifting the basis of representation away from a zero-sum conflict over distributive benefits. One of the attributes of democratic corporatism is that it allows for combining efficient and coherent policies with the institutions of an open society. In an age of economic scarcity and international economic conflict, corporatist institutions may provide the best way

of adopting the need for national unity and policy flexibility with the need to preserve participatory politics. Corporatist theory of democracy presupposes legal form of corporatist relationship, which is based on the interdependence of the interest organization and the government officials. Schmitter, one of the most influential authors on corporatism identifies it as “ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state” (1982). Further, he defines corporatism as “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter 1974, 93). One of the peculiarities of corporatism reside in the monopoly, which prevails in the state versus interest group relations, thus giving only one group the right to speak for a specified category of people. It also posits exclusive authority from the state to regulate a specified sphere of professional or social activity (Hulluban 2002).

In short, pluralistic theory of democracy stands in contrast to the corporatist theory. However, after the post-war period the corporatist model has been modified and developed into neo-corporatism, which guarantees extensive constitutional autonomy to the civil society groups from the state regulatory interventions. The major difference between the two models is that corporatism is more coercive and applies to totalitarian regimes, while neo-corporatism is based on the voluntary agreement between government, labor and business interests and applies to modern democracies. It usually comprises limited number of social groups, which are non-

competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally diversified. These groups are either created by the state itself or explicitly recognized by it. In return for capacity to exert certain influence on these social groups, in terms selection of the leaders and the voicing of demands, the state offers them a monopoly of representation (Molina and Rhodes 2002). Moreover, neo-corporatism implies existence of the strategic institutions which are able to enforce the agreements between business groups, labor associations, and the government bodies. In the following is referred to corporatist civil society as a unifying concept.

On the assumption of the above said, pluralist theory can be applied to the case of Poland, which exhibits fundamental characteristics of pluralist society by having large number of independent and autonomous organizations, which are actively involved in checking on state's policies. Neo-corporatist theory, in contrast, fits best the case of Hungary, where major neo-corporatist civic associations closely cooperated with the state authority with the view of economic development of the country. That is why both country cases will be compared in the following section.

3.4 CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLAND AND HUNGARY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

With the downfall of communist regimes in CEE a new space opened for reconstitution of civil society and gave rise to the process of civil society's mobilization, which was common for democratization procedure. This process prompted two modes of development. First, "there was the re-invention of non-existent, independent sectors of civil society. It was manifested in the massive social mobilization and rapid emergence of a wide spectrum of new organizations and movements (mostly NGOs, foundations, charities, religious and ethnic minority

organizations but also employer and business associations)" (Ekiert and Foa 2011). These newly emerged CSOs, such as NGOs, charities or foundations, did not exist during the communist regime and they had a tendency to compete with those CSOs inherited from the previous regime, they included independent trade unions and new professional associations. As Anheier and Seibel observe, many of these organizations failed to secure resources and attract members and disappeared as quickly as they emerged, especially in the sectors of civil society where they faced competition from the former communist era organizations, such as labor unions and professional associations (qtd. in Ekiert and Foa 2011). Other scholars reveal that newly emerged independent sector had a different level of organizational growth and success and different composition across the region (Mansfeldova and Nalecz 2004). In order to acquaint with differences in speed and intensity of civil society growth in several post-communist countries, namely Poland and Hungary, one can look at Figure 1. After the year of 1989 tens of thousands of CSOs emerged in all four countries of CEE, however each country was characterized by differential dynamics of development. In Hungary, for instance, the rapid development during the early years can be observed. Although, since a mid-1990s civil society growth slowed-down. Declining growth rates are the reflection of the fact that consolidation of civil society as an organizational realm is marked by further development and strengthening of existing organizations rather than the establishment of new ones. This tendency supports the theory of corporatist democracy, which implies smaller numbers of associations, but at the same time their obvious strength. Whereas in Poland representing pluralistic democratic system, CSOs continued to grow rapidly in numbers, pointing out to a fact that they fell short of organizational stabilization.




Fig 1. Organizational Growth of Civil Society in Hungary and Poland
1989-2000. Illus. in Forbrig, Joerg. "A Source of Democratic Legitimacy." European University Institute, n.d. Web. 02 Apr. 2013.

The quality of democracy, the level of external support, traditions common to the particular states, the scope of economic crisis and incidents of war and conflicts have a substantial impact on the institutional configuration, on the manner of collective action, and on agendas set by the newly emerging CSOs. It is common for some collective actors to play a central role in shaping civil society's actions. Finally, in Simon's words "new states employed different strategies to encourage some and discourage other activities through variety of legal regulations and financial means, including registration procedures, tax exemptions, subsidies, etc" (qtd. in Ekiert and Foa 2011).

Second, during the transition process many of the organizations, which existed during the communist regime, have gone through successful reforms and adaptations to new democratic conditions. As on the examples of both Hungary and Poland, the process of reformation was often complicated and lead to the loss of significant

number of members and resources, split into smaller organizations, and change of the organization's heads, agendas and names. As Fric emphasizes, the majority of these organizations survived transition to democracy in a relatively successful way and were able to protect most of resources that they had before 1989. Many of these organizations also preserved old linkages and preferential access to various bureaucratic levels of the state administration (qtd. in Ekiert and Foa 2011). Although, some former communist ruled organizations collapsed and dissolved, others were able to survive by reversing their organizational structure, characteristics and functions. However, there were very few organizations that completely vanished, most of them looked for different ways of adapting to the new democratic system and were lucky to find them.

Notably the adaptation process of emerging organizations and reorganization of civil society's new sectors varied across the region. Each country had a specific mode of civic mobilization and particular nature of political conflict as a consequence of power transfer to democratization. "In some countries the formation of new civil society was a highly contentious process (Poland) while in others it moved in more orderly and subdued fashion (Hungary)" (Ekiert and Kubik 1998). Consequently, organizational landscape of newly established civil societies was often shaped by the intensiveness of the political conflict. Furthermore, the correlation between the newly formed organizations and their predecessors also differed across the region. In countries where the former communist elite continued to rule, CSOs from old regime were more powerful. Whereas, "in countries with more successful political opposition, two distinct patterns of adaptation prevailed, that resulted in either a more pluralist (Poland as an ideal type) or a more corporatist (Hungary) structuring of civil society, with other countries falling between these two poles" (Ekiert and Foa, 2011).

In the words of Ekiert and Foa, “these patterns shaped the rate of civil society organizational growth, the relation between civil society and the state, the level of competition among the organizations, and the level of contention in state - civil society and business - civil society relations” (2011).

Admittedly, transformation of the associational sphere was more dynamic in Poland and Hungary than in any other region of CEE. As a result, the space for independent initiatives and interest articulation was opened. The level of pluralization and lobbying capacity of civil society actors was comparatively high in Hungary and Poland, while in other countries these processes were less advanced. Indeed, Poland along with Hungary had more robust independent sectors than other countries. Thus, “these countries had a higher number of independent organizations, larger and more diverse oppositional movements, more public support for independent activities, more coordination and contacts among independent groups and a higher number of contentious events challenging communist authorities” (Ekiert and Foa 2011).




Fig. 2. Number of independent organizations in June 1989. Illus. in Ekiert, Gregorz, and Roberto Foa. "Civil Society Weakness in Post Communist Europe: A Preliminary Assessment." *Carlo Alberto Notebooks* 198 (2012).

From the graph above it can be observed that by June 1989 Poland had the highest number of independent organizations equal to 60, while Hungary rested on the third place in the rank among the Eastern European countries having over 20 organizations. (see figure 2). Hence, at early stage of democratization, the process of CSO formation was more rapid in Poland than it was in Hungary. The roots for such differentiation between two countries can be traced in their historical background, which is a circumstance of no small importance.

In summary, transition to democracy in region was marked by rapid growth of CSOs and adaptation and further reconfiguration of the old ones to the new political system. Most importantly, Poland and Hungary became the most dynamic countries in CEE in terms of transformation of their associational spheres.

3.5 SOCIETAL BACKGROUND OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

Democratization process in Poland began in the 1980 with the formation of social movements, most of which were supported by the Roman Catholic Church – strong and influential political actor in the country. The Church united over 90% of the Polish population and has always been the source of an alternative spiritual culture, traditionally identified with the preservation of the Polish national identity (Frentzel-Zagorska 1990). Moreover, it has been the only powerful organization independent from state in the whole communist bloc. Also, one of the major distinct attributes of Poland was a ‘culture of protest’ against the communist party, which was characterized by various protesting events organized by social movements from 1960’s onwards. In fact, emergence of the Solidarity movement in the 1980’s was vital in Polish transition process and was characterized by rapid mobilization and

open political struggle between the newly constituted independent organizations and the entrenched forces of the state (Ekiert and Kubik 1999). However, this initial attempt of democratization failed with the imposition of martial law, which resulted in de-legalization of Solidarity movement by the communist regime from 1981 up until 1989. Fortunately, by the end of the decade democratization was back in agenda. In the year of 1988 the country experienced number of massive strikes that resulted in negotiated regime change at the ‘round table’ in 1989 between the Solidarity leadership and the communist authorities. “Poland became the first country in the Soviet bloc to initiate a peaceful transfer of political power” (Ekiert and Kubik 1999). After the resignation of the president Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski in 1990, presidential elections were held. As a result, Solidarity leaders became the governors of the state.

Many scholars attribute an important role of civil society in Polish transformation process. It was considered to be giving stability at times of economic crisis and political chaos (Szabo 1998). The new law passed in 1989 was a guarantor of the liberty of associations, thus leading to the formation of many civil society groups and organizations (see figure 2). As Goll and Leuerer note, negotiated regime change gave the communist party an opportunity to survive, redesign itself and use the dissatisfaction with the economic development to return to government as a post-communist party (qtd. in Goll 2011). Moreover, the fact that Solidarity movement was composed of a broad spectrum of political and social associations engaged in wide variety of activities is also one of the indicators of democratic consolidation of Poland.

Today Poland is a liberal pluralist democracy, which is a reflection of the fact that democratic transition was successful. Its accession to the European Union (EU) in May 2004, after a referendum held in June 2003 in which 77% of the adult population

voted in favor of joining EU, had very positive effect on the economic development of the country and on the democratization of the Polish political system (see BTI 2012). In 2011, Poland took over the presidency of the EU Council. However, civil society is cleavage due to the difference in ideologies and the sociopolitical division in the country remains. Since 2005, there are two right-wing competing parties in the Parliament: Civic Platform Party (*Platforma Obywatelska, PO*) and Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS*), which differ in terms of economic policies, attitudes towards EU. PO favors market economy and is pro-European, while PiS aims at more state intervention in economic policies and adheres to eurosceptic views. Despite these differences, both parties stress the importance of civil society but with significantly divergent emphasis. PiS holds very pro-state standpoints by European standards. According to the BTI (2012), over 70% of Polish population consider democracy to be the best form of governance invented so far. However, the performance of democracy in contemporary Poland is evaluated less favorably, that is because only around 40% to 50% of adult Poles claim to be satisfied with it.

Hungary's transition to democracy was much smoother than it was in Poland or in any other state of the former Soviet bloc. By late 1988 civic activism was intensified and social movements were established, later developing into political parties. Democratic Opposition formed the Association of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and the national opposition established the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF). In addition, nationalist movements such as Jobbik reemerged on public scene. As in Poland, democratic transition in Hungary was peaceful and negotiated. A national round table among the members of newly established and former communist parties took place in the summer of 1989 opening the way for the adoption of new

constitution based on democratic principles. Free and fair elections followed afterwards, making the parliament Speaker Mátyás Szűrös a provisional president.

In contrast to Poland, transformation in Hungary was not only more economy-centered, but also non-confrontational and elite-centered. There were two assumptions for such a passage. First, it was assumed that communists will never resign power, and second, that the only positive way of transforming the system is by changing the character of the communist ruling elite, rather than replacing it. Only under such condition would the ruling communist elite agree to transform the economic and political system if it was convinced of regaining its power after the transition. Moreover, one of the distinguishing features of the Hungarian transition process from Polish was close cooperation between the party-state reformist leadership and reform-oriented intellectuals. As North puts it: “civil society in Hungary flourished in tolerated networks that did not challenge the state and were limited to mutual aid” (1996). And the reason for that consisted in corporatist type relations between the state and interest groups, which presupposed cooperation and synergy. As previously mentioned, Polish civic representatives often confronted state leaders. Hungarian intellectuals instead, aimed for the gradual formation of the civil society, thus making them avoid the Solidarity - type mass social movements, which had a tendency to be formed rapidly. Indeed, Hungarian civic activists demanded implementation of the political reform along with more radical market reforms (Frentzel-Zagorska 1990).

Hungary today represents a liberal corporatist democracy, however not without disadvantages. The first decade of Hungarian transformation was relatively stable and there were no outbursts of public dissatisfaction. However, in the second decade, patience has been lost to a great extent, and with growing social polarization,

social unrest has also increased. 2000s were characterized by increase in strong national and social populism sentiment, which even led to the election of the nationalist party named Fidesz to the Parliament in 2010 (see BTI 2012). In the recent year, scandalous conflict arose between EU and Hungary, on grounds of Hungary's contravention of European treaties by making adjustments to the new constitution, which imply restriction of public use of media, and transgression of laws on central bank and judicial system (*EU Opens Legal Action against Hungary over New Laws, BBC News Europe*). Thus, Hungary is in transitory crisis, with unforeseeable future. As reported in the Pew Research Center's survey of 2 November 2009, about 66% of Hungarians support democratic principles, however, over 77% of Hungarians are dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country (see BTI 2012). So, it is clearly seen that constitutional changes and nationalist propaganda of the major political party (Fidesz), led to the deep division of the Hungarian society on the legitimacy of political institutions.

Having learned the peculiarities of the transformation process in both countries, it is important to analyze the role of popular protest in the consolidation of new democracies. Therefore, the next chapter will be focused on the examination of the causes and outcomes of civil society's contentious activity on the democratization process of Poland and Hungary.

3.6 EFFECT OF PUBLIC PROTEST ON DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The idea of this chapter is to determine whether highly contentious and protesting civil society posed a danger to democracy during and after the transition period or not. And whether protest leads to democratic consolidation or to democratic breakdown. To answer these questions the comparable data sets created by Ekiert and

Kubik in their book *Rebellious Civil Society* (1999) will be used. Survey results reveal interesting facts about the protest events that took place in Poland, Hungary and other former communist countries during the first five years of democratic consolidation, namely during the period between 1989 and 1993. Ekiert and Kubik conceptualize consolidation as a complex process transpiring simultaneously within three realms of politics: the state, political society, and civil society. Furthermore, they outline three conditions for the successful democratic consolidation. These conditions comprise : 1) consensus reached between the main realms of politics regarding the boundaries of a political community; 2) transparency and predictability at the institutional level, which is attained when basic democratic institutions, supported by constitution are being established; when the state is autonomous and stable and is capable of implementing its policies; and when the boundaries between the state, party system and civil society are well defined and ways of cooperation among them are well developed; 3) sufficient level of cultural and social democratization is perceptible, which reflects the legitimacy of the new order (1999).

Referring to the example of Poland, Ekiert and Kubik claim that first and third conditions of democratic consolidation were met from the very beginning of transition process. However, the problems of Polish consolidation were related to the imperfect fulfillment of the second condition.

In fact, until 1993, no fully-functioning democratic constitution was adopted, the power division between the three branches of government was poor, resulting in the political instability, the state was less efficient than the previous one and caused high level of dissatisfaction in the society, and civil society was rapidly expanding. As it was mentioned earlier, Poland was characterized by long history of protest activity and such way of public participation became extremely routinized and

institutionalized. Some might argue that increasing level of contentiousness in Poland constitute a menace to democratic consolidation. However, Ekiert and Kubik claim that, on the contrary, Poland's contentiousness has contributed to the consolidation and even became its significant component. Here the question arises, how can this possibly be? For the most part, protests were organized by civil society activists, including labor unions, along with social and political movements. Protests most often were expressed in the form of strikes and were predominantly nonviolent. An occasion that state was the most frequent target of protest, demonstrated disappointment of the civil society with the inaccessibility of the state and the ineffectiveness of the political parties that were not able to articulate societal demands in the parliament (Kopstein 2003). Moreover, Ekiert and Kubik's survey results show that "there will be more strikes if there are many unions competing for the same audience. Under such circumstances, unions increase their protest visibility in order to outbid each other in wooing potential supporters. As a result, a specific protest-intensive institutionalization of the inter-organizational competition develops" (1999, 193). This sort of findings lends an evidence of the Hypothesis on pluralist civil society, which implies: first, less stable relations of the CSOs with the political parties and state administration; second, more competition among organizations in the pluralist type of civil societies. However, Ekiert and Kubik hypothesize that "political stability can coexist with heightened levels of contentious political participation ... as long as protest does not involve violence and if protestors do not promulgate antidemocratic programs" (1999, 194-195). Therefore, in case of Poland it can be said that institutionalized political participation was a sign of successful democratic consolidation.

The case of Hungary was slightly different. Applying the three conditions of successful democratic consolidation developed by Ekiert and Kubik (1999, 192), it is possible to assert that Hungary has also fulfilled first and third conditions just as Poland did. There has been consensus reached among the newly emerging independent political forces Fidesz (national conservative political party), the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum and former communist party, which later reestablished itself as the Hungarian Socialist Party. Further, there was seen a sufficient level of social democratization reflecting the legitimacy of new order. Most significantly, on the contrary to Poland, Hungary's fulfillment of the second condition was on much higher level, though it was not perfect. First of all, after the roundtable agreement of 18 September, 1989 the Constitution of Hungary has been overhauled, thus opening the way for the multiparty parliamentary elections and direct election of the President. In addition, Constitution provided an institutional structure, which guaranteed separation of powers among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government. Despite these positive developments, protests were still occasional. Hungary had a long political tradition of social movement activity, which was organized by civil society activists or students, who took an active part in protests during the transition period (Szabo 1998). In contrast to Poles, Hungarian protestors chose street demonstrations four times more often than strikes (Ekiert and Kubik 1999, 186-192). Table 1 demonstrates the protest magnitude and repertoires in Poland and Hungary during the early years of democratic transition. The data reveals that protest events occurred in Poland twice as more than in Hungary, also it shows that Poles went on strikes seven times more than Hungarians did. Such a tendency is an evidence of the phenomena that Poland had by far the strongest tradition of political conflicts. Most of the time these were industrial conflicts with strikes as a

dominant form of protests (Ekiert and Kubik 1998). Whereas Hungary had a well-established tradition of street demonstrations and struggles, which played a significant role during the power transfer period (Hofer 1993).

Table 1

Protest Magnitude and Repertoires in Poland, Hungary and Other Former Communist States, 1989-93

	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Population, ages 15–64 (in millions)	11	7	25	4
Protest events	1,254	699	1,476	295
Protest days	5,349	2,574	14,881	2,206
Protests/year	251	140	295	74
Protest days/year	1,070	515	2,976	441
Protest days/million population (15–64)	97.3	73.6	119.0	110.3
Strikes	107	61	432	24
Demonstrations	607	244	544	87
Ratio of demonstrations/ strikes	5.70	4.00	1.26	3.63
Strikes/year/million population (15–64)	1.95	1.74	3.50	1.50
Demonstrations/year/ million population (15–64)	11.04	6.97	4.35	5.45

Source: Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999. N. pag. Print.

Nevertheless, there is one more explanation of fewer protest occurrences in Hungary than in Poland. The reason lies in the neo-corporatist arrangements that were instituted by Hungary. Neo-corporatism refers to a democratic institutional arrangement meant for providing social solidarity, avoiding class conflict, and discouraging individualism among masses, while at the same time providing opportunities for participation by the masses in local, regional and functional groups (Todosijevic and Enyedi 2003). An example of neo-corporatist arrangements would be collective bargaining and social agreements between government, trade unions and employers' associations that was commonly practiced during the transition of post-

communist countries, with Hungary being no exception. According to Wallace and Jenkins and Nollert the institutionalization of neo-corporatist bargaining diminished the likelihood of protest (qtd. Jenkins and Klandermans 2005, 138-164). Ekiert and Kubik support this argument by stating that “countries with a strong social democratic party (Hungary and Poland after 1993) and a centralized labor sector (Hungary) are expected to have fewer industrial conflicts and strikes than would a more pluralistic country with several unions that do not have direct, neo-corporatist access to the political process (Poland)” (1998). In fact, in Hungary institution of top-level neo-corporatist arrangements took place during the early stage of transition. The Council for Interest Reconciliation (national forum for tripartite cooperation of workers' and employers' representatives and the government) was established already in 1988, whereas in Poland it was not until 1994 when tripartite mechanism emerged. Hence, it should come as no surprise that the magnitude of protesting events was much rarer in Hungary than it was Poland. Moreover, it is an evidence of democratic consolidation being successful in Hungary. As a result of close interaction between state authorities and civil society actors through neo-corporatist arrangements Hungary was able to create a viable democracy. Poland, in turn, as an example of an ideal type of pluralist civil society, kept pace with Hungary and succeeded in the transition to democratic system. Next chapter concentrates on the participation of citizens in CSOs and particular engagement norms that persisted in the region.

3.7 CIVIC PARTICIPATION AS INDICATOR OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Much of the previous research builds its argument on weak organizational capacity of civil society in CEE countries upon the rate of membership in voluntary associations, as promulgated in public opinion surveys. In comparison to their

Western European neighbors, Eastern Europeans are less likely to be engaged in civic or political organizations. For instance, EVS conducted in 1999/2000 provides an empirical evidence for this statement. Table 2, illustrates the percentage of the respondents in different countries, who participated in various types of civil society associations in 1999/2000. This table is very helpful for comparing the percentage of civic engagement in both Hungary and Poland (new EU member states) with the countries of Western Europe (older EU member states), which are considered to be older democracies.

Table 2
Membership and Active Participation

	Trade Unions		Political Parties		Religious Church		Voluntary Health Orgs		Sports Recreation	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Great Britain	8.2	2.2	2.5	1.4	4.9	6.3	3.0	10	3	3.9
Germany	7.2	0.4	2.8	0.9	13.5	5.6	2.5	1.3	28	6.7
Spain	3.5	1.0	2.0	1.3	5.8	3.7	2.7	1.4	8.5	3.5
<i>Median</i>	<i>7.2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>5.6</i>	<i>2.7</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>8.5</i>	<i>3.9</i>
<i>New EU members</i>										
Estonia	4.7	0.5	0.1	0.2	7.3	2.8	0.7	0.7	8.8	3.4
Latvia	11.3	2.3	0.6	0.3	5.3	3.8	0.9	0.5	6.6	6.2
Lithuania	1.9	1.3	0.2	0.1	5.4	4.2	2.0	0.5	3.3	2.3
Poland	10.3	2.3	0.4	0.1	5.7	3.7	1.5	0.6	3.1	2.2
Czech Republic	10.5	2.9	0.7	0.4	6.6	2.8	5.9	3.1	22.8	10.5
Slovakia	15.9	5.7	0.2	0.2	16.7	13.1	4.4	3.7	17.6	13.4
Hungary	7.0	1.3	0.3	0.2	12.1	5.4	2.0	1.2	3.8	2.6
Romania	9.2	5.8	0.6	0.4	4.4	3.6	1.0	0.6	2.1	1.2
Slovenia	16.9	3.3	0.8	0.4	6.7	4.5	2.9	2.1	16.9	8.4
<i>Median</i>	<i>10.3</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>6.6</i>	<i>3.8</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>6.6</i>	<i>3.4</i>
<i>Post-Communist: Non-EU Members</i>										
Croatia	11.8	4.2	0.5	0.4	12.2	5.8	3.3	2.3	14.1	7
Belarus	39.0	5.3	0.5	0.7	2.1	4.1	0.7	1.7	1.8	1.2
Ukraine	20.6	3.8	0.7	0.2	4.3	2.2	1.7	0.6	1.9	0.7
Russia	23.6	3.6	0.1	0.0	2.3	0.5	0.7	0.3	4	1.3
<i>Median</i>	<i>22.1</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>0.3</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>3.15</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>1.15</i>	<i>2.95</i>	<i>1.25</i>
<i>All above former state socialist societies</i>										
<i>Median</i>	<i>11.3</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>5.7</i>	<i>3.8</i>	<i>1.7</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2.6</i>

A: Which, if any, do you belong to?

B: Which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?

Source: European Values Survey: A Third Wave (1999/2000). Illus. in Pleines, Heiko, ed. *Participation of Civil Society in New Modes of Governance. The Case of the New Member States*. Working paper no. 74. Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen, Feb. 2007. Web. 12 Apr. 2013.

Regarding the types of civil society associations, Eastern and Western countries are apparently distinct. In fact, compared to old members, Poland and Hungary, along with other new EU members, exhibit higher rate of participation in some of the constituencies. For example, Poles and Hungarians demonstrate higher rate of trade union participation in terms of volunteerism and membership, than some Western European countries such as Spain. Also, affiliation to religious associations, such as church, is higher in Poland and Hungary. Though, engagement in voluntary activities at these associations is lower compared to the older EU member states. Yet, participation in political parties, sports and recreational associations and voluntary work in health associations reside at the lower rate in Poland and Hungary than in other Western European countries.

Thus, survey results show that by contrast to the Western European countries with long established democracies, Hungary and Poland exhibit noticeably lower development of civil society activism. This supports the argument of Howard, which claims that “post-communist citizens have significantly and consequently lower levels of membership and participation than citizens of most other democratic countries” (2003, 147). However, against the background of post-communist non EU members, many CEE countries seem to fare better. What can be possible reasons for such a dramatic difference in participation patterns across the regions? What influences over people’s attitudes and preferences in terms of membership and voluntary activity? In order to answer these questions, it is important to enquire into civic norms, which are specific to each country.

Many authors, including Adam, Curtis and Howard ascribe lower level of citizen engagement in CEE to the legacy of communism (qtd. in Coffe and Lippe 2009). In the words of Curtis “citizens of established and stable democracies, because

they generally have had more experience with the principles and practices of free association, will tend to be more active in forming and joining voluntary organizations of different types''(qtd. in Coffe and Lippe 2009). Therefore, post-communist countries such as Poland and Hungary with relatively shorter experience in exercise of free association were more likely to be less active on public arena and have lower participation rate. Howard argues that while living under the communist regime, people were forced to join state controlled, mandatory organizations inasmuch as other forms of autonomous non-state activity were repressed by the state (2003). For this reason, people's political and civic attitudes and behaviors were underdeveloped and weak. Hence, the new regimes that arose after the collapse of communism challenged people to relearn these attitudes and behaviors directed at greater participation in civic associations (Mishler and Rose 2002). It is interesting to note that each country with post-communist history was able to develop specific citizenship norms. Coffe and Lippe argue that possible reason for such difference could be due to the contrasting ways in which communism was experienced within the Eastern European countries (2009). For instance, each country had a unique experience under the communist regime and during the democratization process, which probably had certain influence on the formation of civic norms and values. And what is more, some scholars argue that the impact of communism on values and norms was weaker where the resistance and opposition to communism were greater (Schwartz and Bardi 1997). Consequently, in contrast to other post-communist states, Poland and Hungary were more civic minded since they experienced weaker penetration of communism. First of all, this was due to the willingness of the communist authorities to concede under the pressure of CSOs, such as Solidarity movement and render assistance in promoting democratic change. In line with the

strong and widely supported collective actor as Solidarity movement, Poland had another significant political actor in the name of Roman Catholic Church, which was an integral protagonist of national consciousness and communist resistance. On this account, “the Polish communist state failed in its attempt to prevent the public presence and even the functioning of the churches” (Coffe and Lippe 2009). In Hungary, on the other hand, “the attack on communism as a system first came from among the ranks of communist reformers themselves. They had already promoted goulash socialism during the communist period: a set of measures intended to raise living standards while maintaining state control” (Coffe and Lippe 2009).

First, it is important to determine the impact of religious faith and church attendance on civic participation. Generally, previous research marks positive affect of religion on civic involvement. As Verba acknowledges, by bringing people together, it creates strong associational ties and serves as an important source of social capital and democratic skills (qtd. in Coffe and Lippe 2009). The data from the ESS of 2002 demonstrates that the role of religion on the citizenship norms of Poland and Hungary is largely positive, but limited to some extent. For example in Poland, church attendance promotes citizen’s duty, which includes importance of law compliance and the responsibility to vote, but it does not influence Polish people’s civic mindedness, which can manifest itself in voluntary engagement and solidarity. In Hungary, by contrast, church attendance has positive impact on both citizens’ duty and civic mindedness (Coffe and Lippe 2009).

Second, the level of participation and membership depends on the trust to civic community. According to the Coffe and Lippe, “the higher the institutional trust citizens have, the stronger their social and political involvement” (2009). So, in the countries where citizens are not satisfied with political institutions, there is less

electoral participation and willingness of the public to perform public service activities. The data of ESS 2002, suggests that there is lower level of trust in political institutions in Poland than in Hungary. Again, these results support the hypothesis that pluralist societies such as Poland exhibit lower level of trust in political institutions, while corporatist ones like Hungary tend to cooperate more with the state in order to promote economic development, thus expressing higher level of confidence in these political institutions. As Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas observe, “corporate polities foster higher levels of associational membership than non-corporate polities, because they promote collective, inclusive forms of political incorporation”(2001, 815). Therefore, it is obvious that people need to have certain trust in institutions in order to hold participatory citizenship norms (Coffe and Lippe 2009).

Apart from institutional trust, scholars as Putnam distinguish social trust, which also can be strongly correlated to civic engagement. In Putnam’s view, participation leads to a better democracy and a better society (qtd. in Coffe and Lippe 2009). Howard and Gilbert find that active citizens are more likely to be trusting than inactive people (2008). However, the research conducted among the ten East European countries Letki revealed that despite the positive impact of social trust on political involvement, it is fairly weak. Furthermore, Gibson insists that trust among people has little in common with attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes, as on the example of post-communist countries, where people use interpersonal trust in everyday life, but it does not have any influence over their political practices (qtd. in Coffe and Lippe 2009). According to the ESS 2002, in Hungary social trust has a positive effect only on the norms of engaged citizenship, thus promoting more voluntary activity of people. Whereas in Poland, social trust has

a significant influence over more duty-based citizenship norms like voting and obeying laws. It is important to note that the influence of social trust is often negative in Poland, e.g. “the higher the level of social trust, the lower the norms of citizen duty” (Coffe and Lippe 2009). Polish case contradicts the assertion of Howard and Gilbert, who claimed that social trust leads to higher social activity of the public; instead, it seems to have rather negative effect on civic mindedness and does not cause higher civic activism in any way. To sum up, not only experience under the communist legacy had great influence on the citizenship norms, but also religion and level of trust that people exhibited towards each other and towards political institutions.

3.8 DEGREE AND QUALITY OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

To provide some empirical evidence of successful transition and to measure the degree of democratic consolidation in Hungary and Poland, the data drawn from the BTI of 2006 will be used. It suggests the most transparent and comprehensive data of all other international rankings and ratings of democracy. In order to evaluate the quality of democracy in the given states, democracy index will be analyzed. The five criteria which demonstrate the level of democratic transformation are based on the concept of democracy, which implies not only free elections, but also the ability of a democratic system to function. These criteria reflect the stability of democratic institutions, adherence to the principles of rule of law, the strength of civil society and political participation. After analyzing the democracy status one can proceed to compare the status index of the chosen countries, which demonstrates the development status of both Poland and Hungary on their way to democracy and a

market economy. Status Index scores comprise combined scores given for the status of transformation in democracy and a market economy.

Table 3
Democracy Status in Poland and Hungary

Region: East-Central Europe	S Status Index	SI Democracy Status				Q1 Stateness				Q2 Political Participation				Q3 Rule of Law				Q4 Stability of Dem. Institutions				Q5 Political and Social Integration			
		Q1.1 Monopoly on use of force	Q1.2 Citizenship agreement	Q1.3 No religious dogmas	Q1.4 Basic administration	Q2.1 Free elections	Q2.2 Democrats rule	Q2.3 Association/Assembly rights	Q2.4 Freedom of expression	Q3.1 Separation of powers	Q3.2 Independent judiciary	Q3.3 Abuse of office prosecuted	Q3.4 Civil rights ensured	Q4.1 Democracy performs	Q4.2 Democracy accepted	Q5.1 Party system	Q5.2 Interest groups	Q5.3 Democratic norms	Q5.4 Social self-organization						
Hungary	1	9,16	9,40	10,0	10 10 10 10	10 10 10 10	10 10 10 10	10 10 10 10	10 10 10 10	10 10 10 10	10 10 10 10	9,0	10 10 10 10	9,5	9 10 8 9	8,5	9 8 9 8	8							
Poland	1	8,90	9,20	9,8	10 10 9 10	10 10 9 10	10 10 9 10	10 10 9 10	10 10 9 10	9,3	10 10 9 8	9,5	9 10 10 10	7,8	6 9 8 8	8									

Source: BTI 2006

Table 3 demonstrates the results deduced for two countries of CEE. First, I compare the democracy status of Poland and Hungary, which is calculated by the combination of scores derived from the following five criteria. Stateness score determines whether there is clarity about the nation's existence as a state, with adequately differentiated power structures. It also helps to evaluate whether functioning administrative structures exist or not. An example would be fulfillment of the basic civil functions by the state apparatus, which include regulation, administration and implementation. The results show that the scores on the monopoly on use of force, citizenship agreement and basic administration are at their highest point in both Hungary and Poland. However, in Poland the score on non-existence of religious dogmas is slightly lower (9) compared to Hungary, where it is unquestionable (10). This is related to the influential role that Roman Catholic Church plays in the decision making process of Poland, despite the fact that the state and church are officially separated. In Hungary, on the other hand, there is a clear separation between the Church and state. Politics and policy-making are secularized.

As consequence, the stateness level is slightly higher in Hungary equaling to 10, than in Poland equaling to 9.8.

The next criterion measures the political participation of citizens and availability of other political freedoms. According to the data, both countries guarantee its citizen's right to participate in free and fair elections, elected political representatives has the effective power to govern, and association and assembly rights are unrestricted for individuals and independent political or civic groups. However, in Hungary citizens, organizations and the mass media seem to express opinions freely (10), while in Poland some insignificant limitations seem to apply (9). As a result, in Hungary the score on political participation is equivalent to 10, while in Poland it is equivalent to 9.8.

The third criterion defines whether state powers ensure civil liberties and maintain a system of checks and balances, thus safeguarding fulfillment of the rule of law principles. As demonstrated in the Table 3, there is a clear separation of powers in both countries. Nevertheless, the judiciary in Poland and Hungary is relatively independent and free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. Moreover, in both countries officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are generally prosecuted, but in rare cases can slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes. In either country civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution and respected by all state institutions. Infringements present an extreme exception in Poland, although in Hungary they might appear in very rare occasions. For instance, there have been some cases of human rights' violation in Hungary, namely discrimination against the Roma people, drug addicts, prostitutes, immigrants and petty criminals. In Poland no violations of civil rights have been

reported. Therefore, rule of law score is somewhat higher in Poland and equals to 9.3, while in Hungary it is equal to 9.

The fourth criterion indicates the level of stability of democratic institutions (national, regional and local governments, the parliament, the judiciary and the public administration) by determining whether they exist and are capable of performing their functions effectively. Also, it assesses to what extent these democratic institutions are accepted as legitimate by government bodies, political parties, associations, interest groups and civic organizations. Results show that in both Hungary and Poland all democratic institutions are accepted as legitimate by all relevant actors. In fact, in both countries effectiveness of democratic institutions is not the highest (9), which means that their efficiency is at times may be dubious. To clarify, in Hungary strong polarization of interests between the left and right wing parties often impedes consensus building. Similarly, in Poland unstable situation in the parliament hinders efficiency of the political governance. And besides that, the tension between the institutions is specific to Poland. Such tensions often lead to counter-productive results, as on the example of tension between the executive branch and the central bank, which, eventually, prevented Poland from accession to the Eurozone. In general, stability of democratic institutions is alike in both countries and equals to 9.5.

The fifth and last criterion reveals whether there is a consolidated civic culture and whether stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state. In order to measure political and social integration of countries, the attention is focused on the stability of party system, the extent of interest groups, citizens' approval of democratic norms and procedures and the extent of social self organization. Results are intriguing. In Hungary the party system is relatively stable and socially rooted, it is able to articulate and aggregate societal interests with low

fragmentation, low voter volatility and low polarization. In principal, this is due to the fact that historically Hungarian political parties were active during the transition period and were largely supported by the population. In Poland on the contrary, the party system is fairly stable and still very fragile. There is a high degree of voter volatility, which has an adverse affect on the political parties causing them become fragmented and polarized. The reason for such a tendency lies in the long history of distrust in political parties by Polish society and a belief that these parties are unable to fully articulate and aggregate societal interests in the parliament. This is also, vivid validation of pluralist theory which implies lower level of societal trust and support for political parties (Poland), while in corporatist societies, instead, the public is more supportive and credibility of political parties is higher (Hungary).

As to the interest groups that act as mediators between society and the political system, Poland has broader range of interest groups (9), compared to Hungary (8), which is one of the determinants of competing social interests and existing levers of cooperation and counter weighting. As a matter of fact, interest groups most commonly comprise social movements, community organizations, unions and professional associations. One of the peculiarities of Polish interest groups is that they are close-knit and committed to promotion of participatory democracy. Despite the fact that two major trade unions Solidarity and All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ) have polarized relationships on the national level, they cooperate closely on the local level. Indeed, religious groups and sport associations are quite active and operate sufficiently. Conversely, in Hungary religious organizations such as church are politically inactive. What is more, trade unions are feeble on the political arena. And without the support of political parties' popular initiatives such as referendums are often ineffective. Thus, above-named

characteristics of Hungarian interest groups reflect their lower ranking compared to Poland.

Moreover, approval of the democratic norms and procedures is not perfect, but slightly higher in Hungary (9) than in Poland (8). Again, this fortifies the argument that in corporatist states there is more tolerance and acceptance towards the state on the part of the community. Generally speaking, Hungarians approve democracy to be the best form of governance, however some societal groups, particularly less educated ones (citizens of rural areas and Roma population) alienate themselves from the EU institutions and have negative attitudes towards Hungary's EU membership. While the elites and well educated part of the population tend to approve of Hungary's EU membership. Poland faces different challenges. Notwithstanding that the majority of Polish population (60%) regards transition to democracy as a good decision; presence of uncertainty about the effective functioning of democracy is quite evident. Also, there is a very low level of trust and confidence in political parties (10%) and political institutions (9%) among the Polish citizenry. Yet, such alienation of public from political sphere is confirmable by the research hypothesis, which expects less stable and trust-based relations between the state and populace in the pluralist political systems.

And, so far to the extent to which social self-organization advanced, the data provided in the Table 3 suggests that both countries have fairly high level (8) of trust and solidarity between citizens and between a considerable percentage of autonomous groups, associations and organizations. In Poland these groups are well developed and interact with each other quite well. At the same time there is low level of citizen participation and engagement in voluntary societal activities (24%). However, small part of the community (13%) works voluntarily to help the people who happen to be

in straitened circumstances, albeit without belonging to a NGO. As anticipated, Poles place less confidence in political parties, which is why the latter suffer from weak organizational basis, but hereby they confide more in civil institutions such as churches (56%), the press (55%), or the police (54%). Such distrust in party system existed in Poland since the very start of the transition and, as it seen from this example, persisted by 2006. Hungarian civil society, on the other hand, focuses more on welfare and culture, rather than monitoring actions of the state, despite the fact that recently NGOs have been granted more competence in policy implementation. Also, prevailing groups engaged in civil society are either socialists or liberals; while nationalist groups are more prone to be involved in protest campaigns.

In sum, Hungary's democracy status equals to 9.40, while Poland's is equivalent to 9.20. There is no substantial difference in magnitude between the two countries, which is an ascertainment of successful democratization being under way in both countries. Moreover, the status index reflects advance of the two countries on their way to democracy and a market economy. The results show the similar tendency; Hungary is leading the way (9.16), while Poland seems to keep up (8.90).

Table 4

The Top Ten of the BTI: The Results of 2003 and 2006 in Comparison

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2006 Top Ten			
Status Index 2006	Status Index 2003	Management Index 2006	Management Index 2003
1 Slovenia	Rank 2	1 Mauritius	not analyzed in 2003
2 Estonia	Rank 6	2 Chile	Rank 3
3 Czech Republic	Rank 2	3 Botswana	Rank 4
4 Taiwan	Rank 8	4 Slovenia	Rank 10
5 Hungary	Rank 1	5 Taiwan	Rank 11
6 Slovakia	Rank 2	6 Slovakia	Rank 6
7 Lithuania	Rank 2	7 Estonia	Rank 1
8 South Korea	Rank 8	8 South Korea	Rank 8
9 Poland	Rank 7	9 Lithuania	Rank 2
10 Chile	Rank 8	10 Czech Republic	Rank 12

Source: BTI 2006

In fact, the two countries were included in the list of Top Ten of the BTI (2006). As illustrated in Table 4, Hungary remains on the 5th place, while Poland is on the 9th among the other 117 transitioning countries all over the world. This is another vivid example of their democratic achievements. But along with this, it is important to keep in mind that the data provided by the BTI was based on the results of the year 2006, nowadays the situation is subject to change. Therefore, positive results of the democratic consolidation in Hungary should not be over idealized, taking into account recent conflict between Hungary's authorities and EU representatives, who accuse Hungary of entering undemocratic adjustments into the new Constitution, thus breaching EU treaties with laws that undermine the independence of the justice system and central bank.

3.9 CURRENT STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

It is a long familiar fact that civil society in CEE is much weaker and less developed than in the countries of Western Europe. As already stated, some of the main shortcomings of the civil society in CEE include relatively low level of citizen engagement in voluntary activities and membership to CSOs, inveterate distrust to the formal institutions, and CSOs dependency on state and foreign funding. Surely it is not possible to deny weakness of civil society in post-communist states, given the supportive survey results conducted during various research projects. However, it must be said that making comparison between these two regions is not only inaccurate, but also irrelevant. Not surprisingly is civil society in CEE feebler. It had to go through the challenging and intensive process of transformation from one type of ideology to another. Eastern European civil society simply cannot be similar to its Western embodiment due to the enormous effect of their historical past. Western type

of civil society is often idealized by many scholars, because it possesses all necessary attributes essential for its efficiency and effectiveness. First of all, let's bear in mind that civil society in Western Europe evolved on the basis of capitalism. Therefore, there have been favorable conditions for its growth and prosperity, the society had an access to the different CSOs and was able to nurture civic values. On the other hand, Eastern European civil society was bound to break the negative popular opinions, which were constructed in the public minds during the long-lasting period of communism. Thus, it is possible to contend that civil society in Eastern Europe cannot be completely similar with the Western model, because it is like a fruit, grown on absolutely different, alien soil as a result of absolutely distinct, centuries of gradual and spontaneous development. As world experience shows, a developed civil society is both a source, and a consequence of political and civil activity of society, forming a solid foundation for democracy. However, the formation of civil society is associated not so much with the development of democracy, but rather with the formation of a stable democratic traditions and culture, based on respect for the rights of minorities and individuals, tolerance and social responsibility. Civil society cannot simply be borrowed; it must grow, based on traditional culture, as economic and political development, well-being and consciousness of the people. Therefore, in the countries of Eastern Europe civil society also has to be given a chance and certain amount of time to grow and become rooted in the gradually forming civic consciousness. It is beyond dispute that Western type of civil society was also formed over a long period of time and did not emerge immediately. For which reason, it is not yet feasible to compare these two civil society types. Indeed, it cannot go unnoticed that civil society in some post-communist countries as Poland and Hungary demonstrate considerably positive results. In order to assess the current state of affairs of civil society in the

two countries mentioned above, the data drawn from the Freedom House ‘Nations in Transit’ of year 2012 will be examined. The variable ‘civil society’ is constructed on the ground of the following question: “Assess the growth of non-governmental organizations, their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions and interest group participation in the policy process” (Mudde 2007).

Poland: According to the Freedom House report of 2012, Polish citizens believe that at present they have been accredited an opportunity to exert an influence on the politics like they never had before. In 2011 many NGOs took an active part in protection of civic freedoms. More specifically joint actions of NGOs prevented legalization of the state censorship of internet content, though an attempt to preclude governments’ tender on the right to control and limit public access to information is still under negotiation. During the 2011, among the most dynamic international organizations appeared Transparency International, Reporters without Borders, and the Helsinki Foundation. One of the domestic NGOs, such as The Institute for Public Affairs (ISP), made substantial contribution to the preparation of the electoral code by issuing analyses on the quality of democracy, public debate, and social policy.

Despite successes in activity of NGOs, much remains to be done for the development of sector in terms of civic mobilization and efficiency of the informal networks. In Putnam’s view, to build a vibrant civil society it is important for the informal groups and individual to be vigorously involved in different activities in their neighborhoods or places of employment (qtd. in Mudde 2007). For instance, in comparison to other European countries, electoral participation of citizens is very low in Poland. As calculated by the Freedom House, during the elections of October 2011 only 48.9 % of Poles took vote, which is 5 % lower than in 2007. In addition, as

before the problem of citizen's rare engagement in organized, unpaid activities for the benefit of their communities is still relevant in Poland. It is worthy of note that results of Survey of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) 2011, prove that Poles still prefer to volunteer individually, rather than being part of any organization. For instance, only 24% of those asked claim to be working for any organization on voluntary basis. Most often people engage in organizations that focus on such spheres as charity, education, religion, and sport. However, when it comes to volunteering outside any organizational framework, 80% of the respondents claimed to be practicing it by helping their relatives (69%), friends (67%), neighbors (49%), individual strangers (36 %), or their local community (20%). Based on the above said outcomes, it is possible to assume that Poles' sense of mutual help and aid is still very deep-rooted, just like during the communist times when people believed that helping others is their personal conviction. Also, it is part of the Roman Catholic value, which encourages Christians to mutual help.

Table 5

Freedom House Scores for Civil Society in Poland, 2003 – 2012

(1 = highest, 7 = lowest)

Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores										
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Electoral Process	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.50	1.25
Civil Society	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Independent Media	1.75	1.75	1.50	1.75	2.25	2.25	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.25
Governance*	2.00	2.00	n/a							
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	2.50	2.75	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.25	2.75	2.50
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75
Judicial Framework and Independence	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50
Corruption	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.25	3.00	3.00	2.75	3.25	3.25	3.25
Democracy Score	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.14	2.36	2.39	2.25	2.32	2.21	2.14

Source: Freedom House 2012, at www.freedomhouse.org

To assess the level of civil society development over the past years, one can look at Table 5, which illustrates that Poland's civil society rating was at almost the highest level at 1.25 during the period of 2003-2008 and since 2009 it remains unchanged at 1.50. Therefore, despite certain shortcomings, the success of Polish civil society developments is evident. In line with that, the democracy score is quite high as well at 2.14. In fact, Poland was labeled as consolidated democracy by Freedom House, which is an achievement worth noticing.

Hungary: As reported by Freedom House, there are about 70,000 CSOs registered in Hungary by 2011. They employ around 100,000 people and contribute 4 to 5% of the annual gross domestic product. Therefore, civil society in Hungary is fairly dynamic and strong. In general, the state is favorable to formation of the new NGOs, associations and foundations; therefore the legal framework has been eminently facilitated and it became far easier to establish them. Also, in the recent years new civic and political movements were created, thus mobilizing broad range of people. One of them was a movement called 'One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary', which was initially created on the internet based social network - Facebook. It quickly gained momentum by gathering almost 100,000 members, who in conjunction with other NGOs organized the largest antigovernment demonstrations of the past 20 years. Their protests were directed against Fidesz government, which is often regarded as authoritative. Along with that, trade unions that lately were gradually vanishing due to the lack of public trustworthiness now got the chance to be resuscitated. In 2011, labor unions organized multiple worth-while demonstrations. The most considerable protest action became the so-called Clown Revolution, which started in response to Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán's "alleged disparaging remark that he would delegate his 'clown affairs secretary' to deal with trade unions"

request to negotiate planned benefit cuts" (*Pluralism (Social Science)*). As a result, in June 2011 about 10,000 people came to streets to express their dissatisfaction with the prime minister's statement.

However, despite positive awakening in some spheres of civil society, yet it is not an indicator of that problems don't exist. Just the opposite, considerable reduction in state and foreign funding of NGOs put existence of some financially fragile organizations at serious risk and caused profound changes in their management and policymaking. Only in 2011, annual allocation of government funds was reduced from 7 billion forints to 2.8 billion, and later in 2012 was cut to 1.4 billion. Also, it should be pointed out that due to the prevalence of small-scale NGOs over large-scale ones, they are affected the most and are in jeopardy of being closed. Therefore, aiming at re-establishing a philanthropic culture in Hungary and some other countries of CEE (including Poland), the one percent tax scheme has been introduced. Under the one percent law, taxpayers could allocate one percent of their personal income tax to support nonprofit organizations. This encourages citizens to use their own funds to support NGOs as they cannot always rely on state budgets. Although, according to the survey conducted in June 2003 by the Hungarian NGO called Nonprofit Information and Training Center (NIOK), about 29% of the CSOs surveyed were satisfied with their one percent income, and 48% were only partly satisfied (Koncz 2005). The organizations said that, along with the funding, the principal advantage of the one percent law was that several taxpayers acquired knowledge on NGOs and their activities. Almost 60% of the organizations surveyed complained that the one percent system kept the donors anonymous, when these groups would prefer to establish a closer relationship with their donor. So, this type of tax-system certainly has some

shortcomings for the NGOs, however it serves as an alternative way of funding, which is crucial for the sustainability of many CSOs in the region.

Overall, preceding from the aforesaid it is evident that there is a slight decline in Hungary's civil society rating over the years (see Table 6).

Table 6

Freedom House Scores for Civil Society in Hungary, 2003 – 2012
(1 = highest, 7 = lowest)

	Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores									
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Electoral Process	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.25
Civil Society	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00
Independent Media	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	3.25	3.50
Governance*	2.50	2.50	n/a							
National Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.50
Local Democratic Governance	n/a	n/a	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Judicial Framework and Independence	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.75
Corruption	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50
Democracy Score	1.96	1.96	1.96	2.00	2.14	2.14	2.29	2.39	2.61	2.86

Source: Freedom House 2012, at www.freedomhouse.org

For instance, similar to Poland's ratings, from 2003 to 2006 Hungary's rating was equal to 1.25, which is a very good score and an evidence of civil society's dynamism. However, since 2007 it started declining and reached the score of 2.00 by the year of 2012. It is slightly lower than Poland's indicators. One of the reasons of such progression was due to the substantial cut in funding. Although, recent development in reinventing the civil society sector is very promising and brings hope for future improvement. As to the democracy score, it is estimated as equal to 2.86 and, therefore, is moderately lower than in Poland. However, according to the Freedom House, Hungary can also be considered as a consolidated democracy.

To sum up, relying on the data provided by the Freedom House 2012, it is possible to claim that civil society was and remains to be one of the most important actors in the development of democracy. And its role is crucial for exercising of democracy in each country.

4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The study was set out to explore the impact of CSOs on the democratic transformation process of Poland and Hungary after the fall of their communist governments in 1989. Over the course of the analysis two major types of civil society were identified following the theories of democratic pluralism and corporatism. First, pluralist civil society composed of big variety of voluntary groups guided by a single interest issue. Second, corporatist civil society made up of only one single association for each societal interest. Applying to the above mentioned characteristic, it was indicated that Poland best fits the pluralist model, while Hungary shows signs of the corporatist model. Considering these distinctions in composition of civil society, the research sought to find out which of these ideal types is most beneficial and effective for the consolidation of democracy. In order to answer this question, civil society of Poland and Hungary were compared and contrasted according to the different transformation process they have gone through.

The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the respective empirical chapters: civil society growth during the transition period, effect of public protest on democratic consolidation, civic participation as indicator of democratization, degree and quality of democratic consolidation, and current state of the civil society in Poland and Hungary. This section synthesized the empirical findings to answer the research question of the study. As it was assumed in the research hypotheses, pluralist civil society experienced more organizational growth, more competition among organizations, and less stable relations with political parties and government. Corporatist civil society, on the other hand, had few large organizations which dominated over the smaller ones; therefore the total number of CSOs was relatively low. In addition these large organizations were eager to

cooperate with the state to achieve their goals, instead of watching over its actions, as in the case of pluralist civil society. Analysis of the Poland and Hungary's organizational growth during the transition period, revealed that there was much higher number of CSOs registered in Poland than in Hungary, thus supporting the above mentioned hypotheses. Moreover, survey results drawn from Ekiert and Kubik's research, showed that during the early years of transition CSOs in Poland, namely labor unions and social movements were highly contentious. This was due to the following three reasons: first, historically protesting became an institutionalized form of expressing public demands; second, people lacked access to policy-making through other channels and they did not trust political parties, which verified their ineffectiveness as mechanisms of interest representation; and third, there were many unions competing for the same audience, as a result they aimed at organizing as many protests as possible in order to attract more people into their circles. However, despite high contentiousness of civil society in Poland, it proved to be a significant component of democratic consolidation rather than a threat to it. In Hungary, in contrast, civil society was considerably less contentious, choosing to go on peaceful demonstrations instead of strikes and other types of protests. This can be explained by the fact that Hungary had adopted specific neo-corporatist arrangements, which facilitated tripartite dialog between the state and labor unions, thus giving more access of public to the political process. As a result, these corporatist type CSOs were much more stable than their pluralist counterparts and expressed higher level of trust towards formal organizations. Therefore, cooperation between the CSOs and the government created favorable conditions for the democratic consolidation.

Indeed, the variation in the amount of confidence CSOs placed in the government bodies, later had a significant impact on the membership rate to voluntary

organizations and civic participation. In Poland public distrust was still very prominent, thus leading to the low level of citizen participation. Moreover, communist legacy along with the religious legacy had a profound influence on the civic engagement norms of both Poland and Hungary, thus resulting in the lower participation scores.

One of the most noteworthy results revealed in the research was the successfulness of democratic consolidation in both Poland and Hungary regardless of their pluralist or corporatist nature. The democracy scores provided by the BTI of 2006 and Freedom House report of 2012 proved the success of democratization process in both countries. Analyzing democracy ratings from the year of 2006 and 2012, it was possible to trace the progress of democratic consolidation in the two countries. Interestingly, both countries exhibited almost highest level of democratic consolidation both in 2006 and in 2012 respectively, thus representing liberal type of democracy. In fact, both Poland and Hungary were recognized as most democratic among other transitional countries. Although, democratic achievements of Hungary should not be over idealized, given the recent policies adopted by the nationalist government, which undermine previous democratization progress. Though, nobody knows how matters will go.

Nevertheless, according to the research results mentioned above it is possible to conclude that both pluralist and corporatist models of civil society can have a positive effect on the democratization process and insure full democratic consolidation

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